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STATUTES 
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I, 2, 12 
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i 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
34-35 ,7.1. Procedure for aggrieved person to file claim - Investigations 
Adjudicative proceedings - Settlement - Reconsideration 
Determination. 
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any adjudicative 
proceeding, the commission shall promptly assign an 
investigator to attempt a settlement between the parties by 
conference, conciliation, or persuasion. 
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make a 
prompt impartial investigation of all allegations made in the 
request for agency action. 
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and employees shall 
conduct every investigation in fairness to all parties and 
agencies involved, and may not attempt a settlement 
between the parties if it is clear that no discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice has occurred. 
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request for 
agency action, he must do so prior to the issuance of a 
final order. 
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful and the 
investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during this 
investigation to support the allegations of a discriminatory 
or prohibited employment practice set out in the request for 
agency action, the investigator shall formally report these 
findings to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the director may 
issue a determination and order based on the investigator's 
report. 
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(c) A party may file a written request to the director for an 
evidentiary hearing to review de novo the director's 
determination and order within 30 days of the date of the 
determination and order. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the 
determination and order issued by the director requiring the 
respondent to cease any discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice and to provide relief to the aggrieved 
party becomes the final order of the commission. 
(15) The procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy 
under state law for employment discrimination based upon race, 
color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related 
conditions, age, religion, national origin, or handicap. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS-SUPPLEMENTAL 
Appellee supplements the Statement of Facts in its opening Brief of 
Appellee by including the following additional Statement of Facts: 
1. Paragraph 1.3 of the Professional Agreement Between the Board 
of Education of Davis County School District and the Davis Education Association 1992-
93 provides: 
L3 No change, recision, alteration or modification of 
this Agreement in whole or in part shall be valid 
unless the same is ratified by the Board and the 
Association and is endorsed in writing by both 
parties. [R-10]. 
2. Paragraph 1.4 of the Professional Agreement provides: 
1.4 This Agreement shall be deemed to be a part of 
each individual teacher's contract by reference 
thereof. [R-10]. 
3. Paragraph 2.1 of the Professional Agreement provides in part: 
2.1 The Board of Education recognizes the Davis 
Education Association as the exclusive 
representative of the professional personnel except 
as herein provided. [R-10]. 
4. Paragraph 2.3 of the Professional Agreement provides: 
2.3 The Board shall continue to recognize the 
Association as the exclusive representative for the 
term of this Agreement or any renewal thereof as 
long as there is verification of representation, [R-
10-11]. 
5. Paragraph 2.5.1 of the Professional Agreement provides: 
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2.5.1 The rights and privileges of the teachers' 
organization and its representatives as set forth in 
this article shall be granted only to the Association 
as the exclusive representative and bargaining agent 
of teachers. [R-ll]. 
6, By letter dated September 19,1992 addressed to the School District 
Superintendent, Plaintiff expressed concern over the health care provision which he 
claimed was discriminatory against married couples working for the School District. 
[Findings of Fact, No. 26; R-261]. 
7. On November 10, 1992, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with the Utah 
Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) claiming that the health insurance benefit plan of 
the School District was discriminatory based on marital status, sex, and gender by 
association. [Findings of Fact, No. 27; R-261]. 
8, On March 24, 1993, UADD issued a Determination adverse to 
Plaintiff. [Findings of Fact, No. 27; R-261]. 
9. On April 28, 1993, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the Davis 
County School District in the District Court of Davis County, State of Utah in which it 
was alleged, inter alia, that the School District violated the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act 
on the basis of gender, gender by association and marital status. [Findings of Fact, Nos. 
30, 31; R-261, 262]. 
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A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING 
THAT THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE CONTAINED 
IN ARTICLE V OF THE PROFESSIONAL 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DAVIS EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION AND THE DAVIS COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT CONSTITUTES AN ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT SUBJECT TO THE ARBITRATION ACT. 
Appellant's Reply Brief contains no new arguments and cites no new cases 
on this Point. 
The Respondent School District re-affirms its Argument that the Court 
erred in finding that there was an arbitration agreement for the reason that there is no 
evidence to suggest that the parties intended to have such agreement, the grievance 
procedure provided for in the Professional Agreement is complete within its "four 
corners" and is not unclear or ambiguous and that there is no manifestation of intention 
of the parties to submit any dispute to final decision making authority of an arbitrator. 
All these arguments are set forth in detail in the Respondent's opening Brief. 
In addition to the arguments of the Appellee School District as set forth 
in its opening Brief, the District relies upon a recent Utah case in further support of its 
argument on this point. In Park City Education Association v. Board of Education, 244 
Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App., 1994) this Court had before it a case interpreting a 
Master Contract negotiated and agreed upon between the Park City Education Association 
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and the Board of Education of Park City School District following a process of collective 
bargaining. In that process, the Park City Board of Education had recognized the Park 
City Education Association as the "exclusive bargaining agent" for school teachers in the 
District. Anticipating possible future conflict between the Master Contract and changing 
Board policies, the parties provided that: 
In case of any direct conflict between the express 
provisions of this agreement and any Board of Education 
Policy [,] practice, procedure, custom or writing not 
incorporated in this agreement, this agreement [the Master 
Contract] shall control. 
244 Utah Adv. Rep. at p. 40. 
The Master Contract originally applied to all teachers, including part-time 
teachers, and all teachers received medical insurance coverage under the Master 
Contract. Thereafter, the Board of Education changed its policy to provide that medical 
insurance coverage would not be provided for teachers working less than twenty-five (25) 
hours per week. Plaintiffs subsequently accepted twenty-hour employment contracts 
under the terms of which they did not receive medical insurance coverage and thereafter 
filed suit for coverage. The Trial Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of the 
School District. On Appeal, the issues were whether or not the Master Contract 
prevailed over the subsequent individual contracts and whether or not the Plaintiffs could 
bargain independently for their contracts and were, therefore, not covered under the 
Master Contract. 
6 
This Court, in construing the Master Contract which was arrived at 
through a process of collective bargaining stated: 
Further, common sense dictates that the power to enter into 
a contract includes the obligation to be bound by the 
contract. 
In footnote No. 5, the Court stated that: 
Our conclusion is consistent with provisions of 1994 
legislation establishing a Centennial Schools Program. 
Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-301 to-304 (1994). This 
voluntary program provides that the school directors of a 
participating school may "request a waiver from the local 
board of education of any provision in an agreement or 
contract between the district and its employees that 
prevents or hinders the school from achieving its 
performance goals. * * * * * However, this waiver is 
"subject to agreement between the local board and the 
entity that represented 'the employees in obtaining the 
agreement or contract referred to in Subsection (a). * * * 
* * If a school board were free to unilaterally change 
policies to obviate collective bargaining agreements, §53-
la-302(3)(b) would be superfluous. 
The Court also observed in Park City: 
The court noted [referring to a cited case] that it is well-
established under federal labor law that "although any 
employee can reach a separate agreement with the 
employer, that separate contract must be consistent with the 
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the union. 
....Thus inconsistent separate agreements are not 
enforceable [citing cases]. 
This Court also held in Park City that even separate agreements more 
favorable to the employee than the collective bargaining agreement were unenforceable. 
The Court cited cases holding that: 
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" the policy underlying these decisions is sound. 
Nothing could undermine the authority of a collective 
bargaining unit more thoroughly than allowing individuals 
or cohorts of employees to enforce separate contracts that 
were more advantageous to those employees than was the 
collective bargaining agreement itself Accordingly, 
we decline to upset the balance by allowing individual 
agreements to undercut the union as the bargaining agent. 
244 Utah Adv. Rep. at p. 42. 
In the present case, the Davis School District recognized the Davis 
Education Association "as the exclusive representative of the professional personnel" for 
the purpose of negotiating salary and benefits through a process of collective bargaining 
[Professional Agreement, Exhibit A of Appendix to opening Brief of Appellant, §§2.1, 
2.3, 2.5.1, and 3.1.4]. In addition, the Professional Agreement provides in §1.3 that no 
change shall be made to the Agreement unless it is ratified by both the School District 
and the Davis Education Association and that the Agreement is a part of each individual 
teacher's contract, §1.4. The Appellant, Mr. Reed, was, in fact, a member of the Davis 
Education Association when the Professional Agreement was negotiated. [Findings of 
Fact, No. 24, R-261]. 
Appellant has sought to have the terms of the Professional Agreement 
modified and changed. In effect, he has asked to change the Professional Agreement by 
having the Davis School District provide a separate contract for him with respect to 
medical coverage. This procedure would be contrary to the precepts enunciated in Park 
City Education Association v. Board of Education, supra. If the Park City Board of 
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Education in that case could not violate the terms of the Master Contract to the detriment 
of individual teachers, it follows with equal force of logic ipso facto that Mr. Reed 
cannot compel the Davis School District to violate and disregard the collectively 
bargained terms of the Professional Agreement by creating special provisions for his 
benefit. It also follows that even if Mr. Reed were entitled to arbitration, no arbitrator 
would be empowered to disregard the terms of the Professional Agreement negotiated 
between the Board of Education of Davis County School District and the Davis Education 
Association through a process of collective bargaining. Therefore, it is nonsensical for 
Mr. Reed to continue to insist upon the right to arbitrate when no arbitrator would have 
the authority to violate the terms of the Professional Agreement and could not grant to 
Mr. Reed the relief which he seeks. 
The Judgment of the District Court should be reversed with respect to the 
issue of arbitration. 
POINT n 
APPELLANT HAS PARTICIPATED IN PRIOR LEGAL 
ACTIONS TO A POINT INCONSISTENT WITH 
INTENT TO ARBITRATE, RESULTING IN PREJUDICE 
TO THE SCHOOL DISTRICT AND AS A RESULT, 
APPELLANT HAS WAIVED WHATEVER RIGHT, IF 
ANY, HE MAY HAVE HAD TO ARBITRATION. 
A. APPELLANT'S ACTIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH 
INTENT TO ARBITRATE. 
For the reasons noted in Point I and the opening Brief, Appellant had no 
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right to seek arbitration. Assuming arguendo that such right existed, Appellant has acted 
in a manner totally inconsistent with any intent to arbitrate. Appellant contends, 
however, that "....Reed has acted in a manner consistent with his clear intent of not to 
waive his right to arbitration". [Appellant's Reply Brief, p.5]. If Appellant wanted to 
arbitrate, one is constrained to ask why then did he initiate an action with the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Division and file an action in the District Court prior to the time he ever 
attempted to file a grievance under the Professional Agreement? If the purpose of 
arbitration is to avoid expense and ease court congestion as Appellant claims, 
[Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 5], Appellant's actions certainly manifested an intent 
contrary to those objectives. 
In his Reply Brief, Appellant asserts that " prior to taking any other 
action, Mr. Reed attempted to invoke the arbitration procedures set forth in the 
Professional Agreement by letter dated September 19, 1992". [Appellant's Reply Brief, 
p.8]. The September 19, 1992 letter is set forth as Exhibit "B" in Appellant's opening 
Brief and the characterization attributed to the letter by Appellant's Reply Brief is a 
misrepresentation of what the letter actually says. The letter makes absolutely no 
reference to the Professional Agreement, it does not ask to invoke the grievance process, 
and it says nothing about arbitration. The letter says that Reeds have no choice but to 
take "further action" and concludes by stating: "Therefore, we have sent a grievance 
letter to UEA [Utah Education Association] (a copy of which is attached) and a similar 
letter to the State Anti-discrimination Division". [Emphasis added.] 
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The District Court found that Appellant was aware of the grievance 
procedure set forth in Article V of the Professional Agreement [Findings of Fact No. 26; 
R-261] and that the Appellant took his first step to invoke the grievance procedure 
provided for in the Professional Agreement on May 28, 1993 [Findings of Fact No. 28; 
R-262], which was some eight months after the September 19, 1993 letter. 
In short, Appellant knew all about the grievance process provided for in 
the Professional Agreement and instead of making any attempt to invoke it, filed an 
action with the Utah Anti-discrimination Division and a Complaint in District Court 
before he ever attempted to utilize the grievance procedure. In fact, in his September 
19, 1993 letter he stated that he was filing a grievance with the Utah Education 
Association. 
B. APPELLANT'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION WAS WITH THE UTAH ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION DIVISION. 
Appellant has consistently claimed that the insurance program of the Davis 
School District is unlawfully discriminatory based on "marital status, sex, and gender by 
association". [Findings of Fact No. 27; R-261; Findings of Fact Nos. 30, 31; R-261, 
262]. In fact, on April 28, 1993, Appellant filed a Complaint in the District Court of 
Davis County in which such allegation was made. 
Prior to that, on November 10, 1992 Appellant filed a Complaint with 
UADD and received a "No Reasonable Cause" determination [R-55, 261] and did not ask 
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for a reconsideration or request a hearing with respect to that decision by UADD. [R-
55, 56]. 
The Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act provides in §34-35-7.1(15) as follows: 
(15) The procedures contained in this section are the 
exclusive remedy under state law for employment 
discrimination based upon race, color, sex, 
retaliation, pregnancy, child birth, or pregnancy-
related conditions, age, religion, national origin, or 
handicap. 
Appellant invoked the jurisdiction of UADD on what he felt was a 
discrimination claim. UADD ruled against him. He did not ask for or seek any appeal 
or further consideration by UADD. Under the provisions of §34-35-7. l(3)(d) and §34-
35-7.1(5)(d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the UADD decision must be considered as a 
"final order" and inasmuch as the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act provides that the 
procedure contained therein is the exclusive remedy available to Appellant, he has no 
right or standing to seek further review of the UADD decision rendered against him. 
C. APPELLANT'S REFUSAL TO ASK FOR A GRIEVANCE 
INITIALLY HAS RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO 
RESPONDENT. 
Appellant sought and received a final order from UADD. The School 
District filed a lengthy Memorandum of Law opposing Appellant's claim which he had 
initiated with UADD. After UADD issued an Order ruling against Appellant he then 
filed a Complaint in the District Court seeking to litigate the same issue decided upon by 
UADD. The Complaint was dismissed only after the School District filed a Motion to 
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Motion. Simultaneously with filing his Complaint in the District Court the Appellant 
filed a request under the Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA) 
which required a response from the School District. 
By Appellant's own admission, the purpose of an arbitration proceeding 
is to save time and expense of litigation. It is disingenuous for Appellant to assert that 
the School District has had to go through a UADD proceeding and file a Motion to 
Dismiss and Memorandum of Law in connection with Appellant's District Court 
Complaint without incurring any expense or prejudice. It is equally disingenuous for 
Appellant to argue that the School District has not been prejudiced by responding to these 
earlier actions because "no formal discovery" has been completed. Finally, Appellant 
asserts that "no court ever has exercised discretionary power with regard to this case". 
While no court has issued a decision, the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division did exercise 
its discretionary authority and found that Appellant had "No Reasonable Cause". As 
noted earlier, UADD is the exclusive remedy for the claim which Appellant has asserted. 
In pursuing his argument, Appellant is basically asking this Court to 
believe that the School District was able to respond to three different proceedings 
initiated by Appellant without having incurred any expense or suffered any prejudice. 
Obviously, the School District has been required to expend much time, effort and money 
in responding to Appellant's claims. Appellant should not be allowed to put the School 
District to this expense and then be allowed to file a grievance some eight months after 
he first had the opportunity to do so. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
The Professional Agreement contains Article V which describes a 
"Grievance Procedure". There is no mention of the term "arbitrate" or "arbitration". 
The Grievance Procedure cannot be considered an arbitration agreement because it lacks 
the essential legal requirements to constitute an arbitration agreement. In an arbitration 
agreement the parties agree that a matter will be submitted to an arbitrator and that the 
arbitrator's decision will be final. The Article V Grievance Procedure provides in Step 
3 that the grievance may be submitted to a hearing examiner. However, if the educator 
is not satisfied with the decision of the hearing examiner, an appeal may be taken to the 
Board of Education and thereafter either party may "appeal to an appropriate court of 
law". (Appendix to Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant, tab "A", page 51). The process 
outlined in the Grievance Procedure is fundamentally different from and in conflict with 
the concept of an arbitration agreement. The Judgment of the District Court on this point 
should be overruled. 
With respect to the issue of wavier, if this Court finds that the Grievance 
Procedure does not constitute an arbitration agreement, the question of waiver becomes 
moot. If this Court holds that the Grievance Procedure is an arbitration agreement, then 
the Findings of Fact made by the District court should not be disturbed and this Court 
should hold that Appellant's actions prior to requesting a grievance proceeding were 
inconsistent with that process and that he had waived any right to pursue the matter by 
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grievance or arbitration. The District Court's Judgment on that point should then be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of August, 1994. 
KING & KING 
FELSHAW KING, Esquirt 
Attorneys for Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
Davis County School District 
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